

With regard to the cartels of the pass Colette Soler, Paris, ICG 2014-2016

For someone who, like me, has taken part in the cartels of the pass twice, first in 2006-2008 (and even before that, in the School of the Freudian Cause), then again, in 2014-2016, it is impossible to ignore [*méconnaître*] that the passands' discourse evolves with time. This is because the effect of the doxa of the group upon what is said in the pass is obvious, both on the side of the passands and the passers, and on the side of cartels. To simplify: in 2006 and even before then, at the SFC, the pass was only concerned with recognising the fantasy and the traversal of mourning. The identification with the symptom was not even in question then. In 2014 ... the real, *lalangue*, equivocalities, sound without sense, the letter outside sense, the impossible, the proper name, etc. started to appear in the testimonies.

The *dispositif* and the language of the Other

This theme comes up sometimes in the discussions of the cartels about the passes, and it does so in a rather negative way because sometimes one sees in this a sign of inauthenticity. On the side of the passands, it becomes even clearer when one reads their texts after the pass. One cannot but notice that, at least at the moment, they evaluate the fact that they have been nominated or not in terms of the current themes. The texts of those who are nominated unfold in a way that explains their nomination. The others do the same, but in order to query their non-nomination. They ask, for example, what is missing? Is it the letter, the equivocalities of *lalangue*, etc?

This fact leads us to a theoretical question. Following Lacan, we consider as given, the fact that an analysis produces what we once called the “liquidation of transference” and, nowadays, the “fall of the subject supposed to know”. However, whether or not the passands speak in the *lalangue* of that Other that the community, as a group constitutes, they adjust themselves to the theses discussed by the latter. This indicates without a doubt that the community as a group has the function of the subject supposed to know.

I finally came to the conclusion that there is no reason for surprise or reproach because this phenomenon is inevitable in the structure of the *dispositif* invented by Lacan. This does not mean that there are no disadvantages to it, namely, the disadvantage that consists in encouraging the make believe [*semblant*] of knowledge.

Raising this question constitutes an opportunity to go back to the status of speech in the School, both in the *dispositif* and outside it. Lacan gave some valuable and unique indications at the start of *Television*, which go beyond what he had said previously in “Function and Field of Speech and Language”. He posited, essentially, that on television as well as in his teaching he spoke in the name of the “object” that the audience constitutes when it is listening. There is no distinction therefore between *Television*'s auditor and the audience at his seminar, “a gaze in both cases, which I don't address in any case” he added. There is therefore a disjunction between the object that makes someone speak [*fait parler*], and the address. However, he refers to “speaking to” [*parler à*] those who know something about it (*qui s'y connaissent*), that is, the analysts. This distinction does not only apply to Lacan. The structure of speech itself implies a distinction between the one who listens, the auditor-object who makes someone speak and, on the other side, the one, or the ones, to whom he speaks. Besides, how could an analyst whose profession is based on listening to his analysands and who has, moreover, the “duty to interpret”, not be aware of a distinction that Socrates, the precursor, had already implemented in his time?

I come back to the *dispositif*. The passand is invited to speak about his analysis in a *dispositif* of speech where he knows, because he received the promise, which he may obtain (perhaps, because nothing is certain) from his interlocutor, the title Analyst of the School. It is therefore a structure that supposes, without any possible doubt ... the

transference. Let's not forget that speech, i.e. transference, is demand, demand addressed to a partner who can, and, in this case, who must, respond. Furthermore, the transference, I quote, "ha[s] no end but that of obtaining"...¹²² You recognise the phrase from the "Proposition on the Psychoanalyst of the School". In a psychoanalysis the analyst-partner remains silent so that the analysand is forced to reveal his cards. However, in the *dispositif*, the jury-partner must give a response, either 'Yes' or 'No'. We are perfectly sure that a psychoanalysis can produce the fall of a subject supposed to the "knowledge without subject", that is the unconscious, and also, sometimes, of the identification with the unspeakable object or, with the absence of reason with regard to the symptom. However, when the interlocutor is supposed to respond, this is not necessarily the end of the address to the subject supposed to know in speech. Certainly, a lot of passands assure us that they have goals other than "obtaining" the title, for example, the goal of verifying for themselves the accomplishment of their trajectory, and even of pursuing the analytic experience through other ways, etc., and we do believe them. However the end of the transference that aims at "obtaining" the response of the cartel supposed to know how to evaluate it, is always present, hence the disappointments. The latter show that the demand was there and that the testimony was in part – I am exaggerating here – plea.

There is certainly a big difference between the passand and Lacan in relation to his audience: Lacan did not expect remuneration from it, therefore he was not obliged to borrow his language from it and we know too well to what extent he pushed that liberty, which can only be attained by the one who does not ask for anything. This constitutes a very big difference from the passand. There is another important difference here with the presence of the passers. In the *dispositif*, the roles are distributed in the following way: there is the passand who comes and speaks about himself [se dire] to the passer, and the passer who listens. However, the one to whom the passand speaks in his demand is other, it is not there: it is the jury-cartel, supposed to know... how to listen or to recognise and then beyond that, there is the community.

An enlarged Other?

In 1967, Lacan justified the presence of the passers based on the idea that the passer was close to the passand due to the particular moment in which he found himself in his own analytic experience. I will add that the passer, in not being the one who decides, was susceptible to gathering testimonies whose authenticity had no chance of being heard by any jury. The reason is that a jury, for the very fact that it is asked to give a verdict, be it only in the form of expecting one, leads one to the temptation of saying what one supposes that it wants to hear. Well, with time, we now know that the invention of the passer, which while undoubtedly having other merits, is insufficient to counter this effect. The evolution of the passands' discourse according to the doxa, even through the injection of fragments of knowledge in the most authentic testimonies, fragments that circulate among the productions of the school, are a sure sign of this phenomenon.

In the cartels of the pass some lament this, but they are wrong, because it is an effect of structure and is, therefore, inevitable. At times, some even come to the conclusion that the less the passand knows about what is being worked on in the community and the more he testifies to being at the periphery of what is being elaborated there, the better. As if the passand's ignorance about the School and its doctrine constituted a guarantee of authenticity. I think they are wrong in this case because they forget to ask themselves: "to whom is he speaking", this passand who is virgin in relation to the doxa of the School? Beyond those who listen to him and all other passands, he knows enough to be waiting for the response of the cartel.

Beyond the passers and the jury, one can wonder what kind of interlocutor the community constitutes, the community that listens to those who were nominated, to those

¹²² Lacan, J., "Proposition of 9 October on the Psychoanalyst of the School", trans. R. Grigg, *Analysis* no. 6, 1995, p. 7.

who were not nominated and, also, to the designated passers. We notice that in our School we are fond of these diverse testimonies. The latter are totally unprecedented, given what used to constitute the pass in Lacan's lifetime and in his School. Then, the question of the AS's presentation to the School of the testimony of their pass following the pass itself was never raised as such. Lacan expected the AS to speak only about psychoanalysis. The WAP inaugurated this practice, which puts the community in a place that still needs to be better defined, between that of the passer who listens, and that of the jury supposed to know and whoever makes the decision. Obviously, the one who listens, whether this be the passer or the audience of the School, well, he makes a judgment too. He judges without being in the position of deciding. And this opens up a space for possible disputes between the different judgments and not only on an imaginary level. This occurs in different ways: the passer who does not approve of the decision of the cartel, the public who strongly applauds the one who has not been nominated, as strongly as it contests the decision of the cartel or, on the contrary, the public who remains silent although it disapproves of the nomination. And the juries of the cartels go on protesting, emphasising the fact that the cartels are sovereign and that their decisions, aiming at something beyond the bathroom scales (*pèse-personne*), cannot be discussed from any other place, that is, a place where one knows only 'persons' [*personnes*]. Yes, however it is necessary that the community of the School believe them, that it believe in their capacity to judge beyond the bathroom scales. However, "psychoanalysis today" as we like to call it, is developing in an epoch where, as is well known, the processes of destitution are on the agenda. Can we ignore this? In any case, I have come to the conclusion that since Lacan's School, the pass has changed and it has done so *de facto*, by joining to it the public of the School which wants to listen to the cartels, to the passers, the passands, and to those who were nominated or not. I take note of (*je prends acte de*) this change which, by the way, seems to me to be going well with the spirit of the times, the latter being neither in favour of delegating the power to judge, nor to decide. The question is obviously one of knowing if, by conforming to the spirit of the times, we are not opposing the spirit of psychoanalysis? After reflection, I don't think so. In effect, all members of the community of the School, whether as analysands, analysts, supervisees, supervisors, share a part of the analytic experience. This also applies to the members of the cartels of the pass, because they have nothing else to justify their being given the power to decide other than having been elected after, it is true, having been nominated either AMS or AS. The process is a democratic one and we do not have any other, however it does not constitute in any way an analytic guarantee. So, to where does one address an appeal [*en quel lieu faire appel*]? Lacan had already noticed that, for psychoanalysis, there is no other place to appeal but the community of experience itself. However, this term community that I am using here must designate, not simply a group of psychoanalyst members, but a School where one is analysed, not only to cope with the misadventures of everyday life because these are never ending, and for long enough not to be happy with therapeutic benefits only, and where one works in cartels, in supervision and elsewhere to question psychoanalysis itself. Once again, I reach the same conclusion: the priority is a School, a School that must function as a School.

The said nomination

The expression circulates: one is nominated AS, or not. However, AS is not a name, it is a title, in the same way one is nominated minister, museum director, etc. In all rigour, it does not touch on the being itself, but it participates in the promotion of a competence upon which one will be distinguished after having given some evidence, or at least a few bits of it. We look for these bits of evidence in the testimony of the pass before we try and say which ones have been retained. Lacan said of his pass that it was "as thin as a hair" [*mince comme un cheveu*]. With this title, he intended to "select" [*trier*], that is the term he used, a possible aptitude for a function, that of making oneself "Analyst of the School"

or, in 1975, being able “to think about what they do”¹²³ or, again, in 1976, to “hystorise oneself of and from oneself” as an analyst. However, it is as if, with the judgment whereby the signifier AS is attributed, one touched on the core, on the very being of the analyst, who finds himself either confirmed or annulled. This is in spite of the fact that it always remained of the order of the “improbable” for each one, according to the term Lacan used to apply to analysis until he introduced the logic of the inconsistency of the “not-all”. It is different when it comes to a name. A name, a true one, does not concern the being, but rather what ex-sists by way of a real [au titre d’un réel]. A name does not have a signifier and it is precisely because of that that it can however have a name. Lacan said he was very surprised¹²⁴ by this irreducible over-reaction (sur-réaction) in the same way Freud is said to have been surprised by the emergence of the transference. Would this over-reaction come from the fact that every judgment of attribution of a signifier, here AS, “decrees, aphorises, makes an oracle”?¹²⁵ One could wish to believe that the perceived annoyance results from the fact that the judgment of the members of the cartel of the jury – a judgment that one likes to qualify as “intimate” (are there any judgments that are not intimate?) – does not specify the reasons. And the cartels of the pass are being asked to give reasons. No, they won’t give any and this is by definition: if there were any “reasons” for it, there would not be any judgment that ... recognises.

That recognises what, if not a singularity? This is because the structure is to be constructed, it is to be detected; it does not have to be “recognised” as such by one’s fellows. In saying that, it would be a mistake however to idealise singularity – even if it must be defended against all the standards that tend to cover it in common discourse – because singularity is a destiny. The fact that the cartels are waiting for it is the minimum one can demand of them. They don’t have to feel praise for it because the structure is only realised by singularities that have absolutely no need to be recognised in order to be. Their authentication in the pass, however, implies a change of great importance: it links one unary singularity to others. It has the effect, therefore, of creating a social link. When an AS is nominated, the whole community pays its tithe¹²⁶ and it pays the passands for their demand and their willingness to make use of the *dispositif* that Lacan made available to them.

The duty to authenticate

Therefore, we are talking about a judgment that recognises. But what is to be recognised? This question is asked by every member of the cartel, and is always based on the indications given by Lacan and relayed by the doxa of the School. There are many indications but all of them imply that in the pass, it is not the passand who is being scrutinised, neither his clinical structure, nor his being of desire nor of the symptom, all of which constitute the object of an analysis but not the object of the pass. In the *dispositif*, only the testimony that the analysand is able to give of his analysis, its trajectory and its results, is at stake and, more specifically, the change produced for the one who came to call himself an analyst. Therefore, will it be about authenticating a finished analysis and the process of its particular advances up to its “points of finitude” or, rather, the performance of the testimony even in cases where the process remains unfinished? In

¹²³ Translator’s note: Lacan, J., 1985 *Geneva Lecture on the Symptom*, Analysis no.1, 1989, pp. 7-26: “we notice that this title, whether it is attributed or not, resonates for the subjects in question well beyond its limited scope. One cannot ignore it and to take it into consideration is very instructive.”

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ Lacan, J., “The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire in the Freudian Unconscious” in. *Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English* trans. B. Fink, New York and London, W.W. Norton & Company, 2006, WW Norton & Co, New York and London, 2006, p. 809.

¹²⁶ Lacan, J., “Joyce le Symptôme” II p. 33, in *Joyce avec Lacan*, Navarin, Paris, 1987, and my article “L’Un tout seul et ses liens” in *Stylus* no. 33 and *Revue Champ Lacanien* n. 19 to be published in 2017.

other words, is it about authenticating the subject's capacity to think his own experience since, according to Lacan, the analyst is double? He is the one who operates in the treatment and also, the one who thinks his operation. The question is to be posed as such and the indications given by Lacan focus on both aspects.

First of all, we possess all the indications concerning the passand's analysis. The first emphasis is on the moment of the turning point for the possible analyst with the conditions that are well laid out in the "Proposition on the Psychoanalyst of the School": the traversal of the fantasy, which ensures the passage from the family romance of the trauma (if I may allow myself this condensation) to the silence of the "traumatisme", to the words that are lacking (but not the images) for the being "object" [l'être "objet"], – whether the linguistic equivocalities are present or not – and which make being [qui fait être] "singularly and strong".¹²⁷ Is that constituted by the end of an analysis or by a turning point that allows for the final phase? The debate has been open in the past and a lot of contributions have been made on that theme in our School. Lacan himself already decided at the time that it was necessary to make a distinction between the turning point of the pass and the end of analysis. However this debate is, in fact, now closed and everyone is speaking about nomination as the sign of the end of an analysis. And those who were not nominated are surprised: "But I thought I had finished ... Besides, in 1976, in his Preface to the English Edition of Seminar XI, Lacan himself added some considerations, which were less focused on the possibility of a hypothetical moment of turning point, than on the end of the analytic process. This time, the emphasis is not on the lack of words to say the truth of the object, but on the words that do not lack, the ones of the unconscious without a subject, a knowledge that is at the level of *jouissance* i.e., a real knowledge, because it is outside sense. The analysand will be satisfied with this real knowledge after having grasped little bits of it, and no more. He will never have the assurance of being able to transmit something of it – "one knows it" (on le sait soi) – nor of the result, because the latter remains in suspension in any case. At the same time, however, by entrusting the passand to hystorise his analysis in the process, Lacan puts the accent less on the analysis itself and on its end, than on the passand's capacity to transmit something of it.

Among this profusion of indications, how is it possible not to interrogate what orients anyone's judgment in the reception of a pass, as far as it is possible to circumscribe it? Obviously, everyone can only decide for oneself and not on their colleagues' behalf. I am therefore taking the risk of doing so.

That which decides

I must say that in the discussions with the colleagues of our CIG - a truly excellent one which made some very good decisions – I have often felt a gap between my points of view and that of a few others concerning what orients the decisions of a cartel. I can only say it in my own name [*titre*] because, without any doubt, in the pass as well as elsewhere, what the auditor (passer or cartel) grasps has a double structure: first of all, his own pre-judices [*pré-jugés*], and secondly, his aim. These are the basics of the structure of speech as presented by Lacan in "Variations on the Standard Treatment". They led Lacan to formulate that the one who listens is the "master of truth", before saying later that the one who listens is in the position of a subject supposed to know. And effectively he is, because whatever constitutes the basis of his listening and the point of focus of his attention depends only on him. In analysis, for example, one knows very well that there is a difference between aiming at the words to say it, i.e. the signifiers, if not the phonemes of *lalangue* and/or at sense, and aiming at the One-saying *sinthome*, to use the latest formulations.

We agree that we expect testimonies of the analyst's desire. I'd like to make two

¹²⁷ Lacan, J., *Discours à l'EFL, Scilicet 2/3*, Paris, 1970, p. 21.

remarks on this point. The first one is based on experience: since the beginning of Lacan's School, everybody agrees that there are no testimonies on the analyst's desire. Lacan himself said it: obviously, I haven't received any. This is for a good reason: the *dispositif* uses speech and, at the same time, it constitutes an impossible that relies on speech. In "The Direction of the Treatment",¹²⁸ Lacan speaks of the incompatibility of desire with speech. This thesis dates from the "Direction of the Treatment". Desire is unpronounceable however, it is pronounced. In analysis, one tries to "circumscribe" it through deciphering and through interpretation. But how is it in the pass? We know Lacan's famous sentence, which is precisely about the analyst's desire: to believe one has entered it and to have found oneself in it, is to be out of it for good. However, this exit is not just any exit, it constitutes a return to the analysing way [*la voie analysante*], to the one which, precisely, attempts to formulate desire, until it stumbles upon the impossible. Moreover, isn't it because this desire is unpronounceable that one cannot authenticate it? And if this is the case, how does it happen?

Lacan offered an answer: the index of this desire is the analytic act. The unpronounceable analyst's desire is the desire supposed to the act. This desire is not itself without phenomenological indices. However, there is an "aporia" as well in the account given by the analysand, for the very fact that the act is not a subject. Rather, the act subverts the subject. However, the act is attested to through "its effects", says Lacan. In analysis, only those who have finished testify to the act of the one who has directed the treatment. This is why Lacan did consider nominating as AS the analysts of the analysands who were already nominated AS. However, when it comes to the passands, the effects of the act that instituted them as analysts cannot be recognised in the analyses they conduct or will conduct. Thus, one can only resort to the antecedents of the act, i.e. their own analysis, which, alone, can create the conditions, and no more than the conditions, before the effects can verify the act. So, what do we expect of what Lacan called "hystorisation" of an analysis in the testimony of the pass, in order to pronounce a nomination? In the end, isn't it necessary to confront this question without any detours?

You have already probably heard, since it has been a recurrent theme for some time, that in the pass, one does not wait for anything but a surprise. That one does not wait for anything is a pure lie, if not misrecognition (*méconnaissance*). As I have already said, one cannot listen without judging and without any presuppositions. This is a principal thesis about speech. Concerning surprise, one certainly waits for it in an analysis. In the same way, one looks at surprising the unconscious in it. However, in the *dispositif* of the pass, one does not have to wait for the surprise as it is already there, always, in every pass. However, the surprise is not always a good one. All passands come up with a surprise, those who are nominated as well as those who are not nominated. This cannot be any different, because the *dispositif* organises an encounter with what is most intimate in every singularity, and we cannot fail to find it in the pass. To be surprised by it is not a virtue and we have even seen – and this is not fiction – the case of a cartel that expected something so radically different that it ended up protesting against what surprised it in a first place.

So, what I look for is the assurance that the passand's testimony indicates, or rather, that it allows the perception that his analysis was pushed far enough to reach a certain point that will be the condition for the possibility of an act. In listening to my colleagues, I believe that most of them share this view. I have already said that analysis is what is at stake in the pass, and not the symptom-being of the passands. In other words, it is not about their clinical structure, although the *dispositif* provides a remarkable vantage point in that respect. It is not only neurotics who go through the pass. All the classical structures are represented in it and I will go back to this later. Of course, when the testimony does not give the assurance that there has been an analytic trajectory, this does

¹²⁸ Lacan, J., *Ecrits*, The Direction of the Treatment and the Principles of Its Power, W.W. Norton & Co, New York and London, 2006, p. 530: 'But desire is nothing but the impossibility of such speech...'

not mean that the trajectory did not take place. Experience and testimony about experience are two different things. However, in this case, an insufficient “hystorisation” will blur the reading of an analytic trajectory, which in turn will constitute an obstacle to a nomination.

Hystorisation. This term has had much success for quite some time now! Applied to analysis, it has precise and multiple connotations. However it indicates in the first place that what is at stake here is to give a narrative of what happened under transference, if possible from the point of entry to that of exit. To hys-torise oneself, even when it is written with a hyphen that divides the word in order to evoke the torus of neurosis, is about fabricating the romance of one’s own torus. Hysteria tells stories, always; it is part of its structure and that is its virtue. This is the reason why I use the Freudian term ‘romance’. However, I write the word without the hyphen. One cannot deny that the testimony of the pass is a narrative made for a double audience, one comprised of two passers. Therefore, it has a structure both of speech and of language. This is the reason why, as in the Witz, it can pass through the filter of the passers, except when the latter constitute a screen, and this happens sometimes when they allow something heard that is not part of the narrative, but that will remain unheard without the narrative. The pass cannot be out of the structure of speech. What is said of the narrative can, on the one hand, bring out the Ones of the unconscious, of the sound without sense, of the letter which cuts through the sounds and, on the other hand, the impossibility of filling the troumatisme of the lack in knowledge and the impossible to say (dire) and, finally, of all the guises that the real takes, to use our common language of the moment. But what we are looking for is precisely what is un-common, what is specific to that singular passand. The real unconscious is certainly specific to each one, however it cannot reach us without a narrative where, as in any historical narrative, sense can only be present. Therefore, no isolated, or local, or erratic element of the unconscious, or again any concluding saying (dire) will be sufficient for making an analytic trajectory readable. Too much importance has been given to the “beyond sense” from the time we started putting the emphasis on the function of lalangue. There is certainly some “outside sense”, we name it “the real “, and an analysis can and must aim at it, as I emphasised. However, nothing can stop the “leaking of sense” in speech. One rightly emphasises the recognition of the outside sense [hors sens], one insists on the necessity of the emergence of linguistic equivocalities, of the enigmatic real letters. I don’t deny it: the fabric of the unconscious made of lalangue is made of the outside sense and of the erratic elements that condense jouissance. However, there is a ‘but’: on the one hand, what is being grasped is always a “lucubration”, that is an attempt at grasping some knowledge in lalangue. This is valuable because in an analysand it constitutes an index of his access to the real unconscious. However, one cannot make of it the key for identifying the analytic effects, especially since some subjects have access to it from the origin, that is, structurally.

Here is an example to clarify what I have said. Lacan’s sentence, “I am a poem and not a poet, this is what I would have brought to the pass if I had been through it”, has been widely commented on. Well, for sure, he would not have been nominated if he had not said anything more. This is because we have here a very condensed and precise proposition, which arrives, as we know, as a conclusion to a vast work of elaboration. It is, to speak properly, a “saying” (dire), which does not only imply that he has become aware that the unconscious speaks without him, but also, that his conception of the unconscious and its relations to the subject is inferred and clarified by all the previous sayings of his teaching, and this convinces us. However, let’s imagine a passand who might present a similar condensed conclusion without saying anything about the trajectory that led to it? One would expect that he make his assertion credible by basing it upon what was modified in his trajectory, upon the transformations and the retroactive light that the analytic work brought to his sympt-trauma at the point of entry. Moreover, we would even expect him to indicate the remainder of the opaque symptom that would certainly remain present. If not, how could we recognise a saying in it, the saying that his analyst made “ex-sist”? How to even recognise the One-saying sinthome of his analysis, if it does not lead to the

perception that the major sayings that unfolded during the work of his analysis have found their unity in it, if not their quilting point (point de capiton)? The nature of the signifier outside sense is constitutive, but analysis proceeds through the saying in act and in particular, for the analysand, the act of demand. Besides, analysis aims at making “a saying ex-sist” via the succession of the subject’s sayings of truth. The latter never fail to convey the subject’s castration and their half sayings (mi-dire) do not fail either in cutting through the postulate of the subject supposed to know. However, the One-saying has yet another function, a more inclusive one, if I may say: it supports the nodal One of the metabolism of desire and jouissance, specific to each one. These formulations, which were produced at the end of Lacan’s teaching, and not by chance, have the advantage of having a trans-structural impact. As I already said, all the classical clinical structures are present in the pass and they are easily recognisable, based on my own experience. But in any case, analysis is in question. Unless one considers that there is a standard treatment for each structure, one will ask of the testimony of a psychotic and of a neurotic that it transmit how his analysis was, how it operated upon the symptoms he identified at the point of entry, whatever they might have been, how his analysis eventually re-oriented the desire conveyed by his interpretation in fantasy and, finally, what the balance is.

I conclude by using an analogy, again to make myself better understood. Lacan said about biographies that, sometimes, when a biography is well written, one can perceive in it the unique phrase that organised a whole life. There is something of it in the hystorisation that one makes, not of one’s life, the one that has already been hystorised in analysis, but of one’s analysis: one ought to perceive in it the unity of all of one’s options, all of one’s sayings, no matter in what *lalangue* this unity occurred. Also, one ought to perceive in it the link between the singular symptoms at the point of entry and the changes at the end, changes that the subject will be able to testify to, as well as to their retroactive effects. Aiming at the One, whether it is said simply by evoking “the phrase” that orients a life, or via the sinthome-saying whose access is more difficult, applies in all cases to all structures. According to Lacan’s expression, the One is made to ex-sist in an analysis in order to be read in a pass, and this is the only way to suspend not only the social norms of discourse, starting from the sexual ones, but also all the norms that come from psychoanalysis itself in the judgments of the pass. These are sometimes masked by some concern about the clinical structures – which certainly ought to be identified, but not evaluated in the pass. In effect, one understands – at least I hope – that for the one who allows his One-saying to be read in his testimony, this does not imply that he enunciate it because his One-saying is to be inferred from his sayings. This is homologous in fact to the saying “I am a poem and not a poet” that I evoked earlier. For that particular passand, there is no need anymore to ask if his castration is sufficiently assumed, his transferenceal credulity sufficiently reduced, if his relationship to knowledge is the right one, if he has sufficiently taken the measure of his “non-knowledge” (*non-savoir*), if he has traversed his fantasy, if he has elucidated his symptom-relation to his partner or, if his structure is compatible with analysis, etc. It is the proof by the One-saying, a proof that also requires verification through its effects.

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Translated from French by Chantal Degril